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11 Introduction
Economists comparing the competitiveness of electronic and traditional market en-
vironments often argue that electronic commerce entails lower transaction costs. On
the demand side, the cost to consumers of becoming informed in e-retail settings is low
due to readily available online information and superior search capabilities.1 These
lower transaction costs and the globalization of markets may enhance competition
and result in prices that more closely match the external economic environment. On
the other hand, the fact that these new technologies permit ﬁrms to monitor rival’s
prices and to adjust prices in real time may lead to higher prices due to collusion.2
While a number of papers have documented that the Internet has yet to eliminate
price dispersion (see Bakos (2001) and Smith et al. (1999) for surveys and Baye et al.
(forthcoming) for an analysis of the impact of market structure on price dispersion),
relatively little is known about the economic forces that induce ﬁrms competing in
online markets to adjust their prices. Since it is arguably easier for ﬁrms to change
online prices than to change price tags at brick-and-mortar outlets, one might expect
prices posted in online markets to change very frequently in response to changes in
marginal cost and other economic factors.
To examine price adjustment patterns in online markets, we assembled ﬁrm-level
panel data consisting of daily observations on the rates charged by diﬀerent online
lenders for 30-year ﬁxed-rate mortgages.3 The data indicate considerable variation in
1The order in which search results are presented to potential buyers online is also an impor-
tant determinant of market competitiveness (See Arbatskaya, 2001). For an empirical analysis of
consumer behavior on the Internet, see Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000a).
2The availability of information and short detection lags are some of the requirements for main-
taining a cartel agreement.
3Data come from Microsurf, which is a price comparison site for mortgages. Mortgage providers
submit their mortgage rate quotes, and terms and conditions for loan origination to Microsurf in
real time. Microsurf collects the information from a number of lenders across the United States and
publishes it on its web site accessible free of charge to consumers.
2ﬁrms’ pricing decisions. For example, Figure 1 shows the minimum, maximum and
average rate charged for a 30-year mortgage among diﬀerent lenders for the period
April 30, 1998 through July 22, 1998. The range in interest rates charged — the
diﬀerence between the maximum and minimum rate — exceeds 0.25 on all but one
date in the sample. As shown in Figure 2, the wide range in rates is not an artifact of
two outlier lenders that posted unusually high and low rates. Dispersion in mortgage
rates appears to be an equilibrium phenomenon among online lenders. Figure 3
demonstrates that price diﬀerences are not transient in nature — they are observed
o v e rt i m ea n do nb o t ht h eﬁrst and last day in the sample. These observations are
consistent with a variety of theoretical models of online price dispersion, as well as
levels of dispersion documented in online markets for books and electronic products.4
Since the persistence of price dispersion in online markets is well-documented in
the recent literature, our aim in the present paper is to identify factors that inﬂuence
ﬁrms to adjust their prices. This focus is motivated, in part, by the considerable
variation observed in online lenders’ decisions to adjust the mortgage rates posted at
Microsurf. For instance, based on daily rates for 30 year ﬁxed-rate mortgages listed
at Microsurf over the three-month sample period, one lender (Universal Mortgage
Corporation) never changed its posted rate, while another lender (Custom Mortgage
Corporation) changed its rate about 70 percent of the time. Over the period, the
10-year T-Bond rate (a commonly used proxy for lenders’ marginal cost of funds5)
c h a n g e do no v e r87 percent of the days.
In Section 2 we show that a variety of diﬀerent theoretical models predict that the
frequency with which ﬁrms adjust their prices depends on structural variables, such
4See, for example, Baye-Morgan (2001), Baye et al. (forthcoming), and Brynjolfsson and Smith
(2000b).
5See, for example, Roth (1988).
3as the number of competing ﬁrms, characteristics of the product, the frequency of cost
changes, and the menu cost of adjusting prices. In Section 3 we describe our data and
explain why it is well-suited for an econometric analysis of the determinants of ﬁrms’
decisions to adjust the prices posted on the Internet. Section 4 presents the results of
our data analysis. The econometric analysis reveals that market structure is a critical
determinant of the frequency with which online lenders adjust their rates: Rates are
adjusted more frequently in markets with a large number of competitors and less
frequently in markets where competition is less intense. Similar to recent studies by
Peltzman (2000) and Borenstein et al. (1997) documenting asymmetric responses by
traditional brick-and-mortar establishments, we ﬁnd that online mortgage rates also
respond more quickly to increases than to decreases in lenders’ cost of funds. Section
4o ﬀers concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Considerations and Stylized Facts
Before turning to a formal presentation and analysis of the data, we brieﬂys u m m a r i z e
some of the theoretical and empirical literature that is relevant for understanding
price setting behavior at Microsurf. First, a number of models indicate that the
price dispersion observed at Microsurf is consistent with equilibrium behavior, and
that the likelihood a given ﬁrm oﬀers the lowest price on a given date depends on
the number of ﬁrms competing in the relevant market. For instance, clearinghouse
models (cf. Rosenthal, 1980; Varian, 1980; and Baye-Morgan, 2001) assume that
some or all consumers have access to a list of prices charged by diﬀerent ﬁrms. In
the present context, this amounts to assuming that at least some consumers observe
the list of rates provided by Microsurf on any given day. A key implication of these
4models is turnover in the identity of the ﬁrm oﬀering the lowest mortgage rate.
Table 1 illustrates that the data we collected from Microsurf share this feature.
In particular, note that over 80 percent of the ﬁrms in our sample oﬀered the lowest
mortgage rate on at least one date in their local markets (states) during the three-
month period. This high turnover in the identity of the ﬁrm oﬀering the lowest
mortgage rate is not consistent with ﬁrms maintaining the same relative position
in the distribution of mortgage rates. In particular, if a lender’s position in the
distribution of rates did not change over time, then the distribution summarized in
Table 1 would have all mass at “Never” and “Always.”
In addition to this existing literature on price dispersion, there are extensive
theoretical and empirical literatures examining price rigidity in conventional retail
markets. The empirical literature ﬁnds that prices in many markets are surprisingly
rigid.6 However, Levy et. al (1997) show that price rigidity varies considerably across
markets, depending on the magnitude of menu costs. Speciﬁcally, in retail markets
where legal restrictions require that a product’s price be printed on each item, prices
are adjusted less frequently than the prices of products exempt from the law. There-
fore, price adjustment costs (menu costs) provide a compelling explanation for price
rigidity. When ﬁrms incur signiﬁcant costs to change their prices, prices are less
responsive to changing market conditions.
In the online mortgage markets, menu costs are relatively small for lenders since
they can change the rates posted at Microsurf with a few simple keystrokes. More-
over, the institutional setting at Microsurf provides lenders with an incentive to
regularly (at least daily) update their rates: Lenders with the most up-to-date rate
6For empirical evidence on price rigidity in retail trade see, for example, Kashyap (1995) and
Warner and Barsky (1995); for evidence of price rigidity in the banking industry, see Neumark and
Sharpe (1992) and Ausubel (1991).
5quotes are displayed at the top of the list of available rates. Any existing costs of
price adjustment should then be due to the cost of gathering information regarding
market fundamentals and making a pricing decision. In light of these low menu costs
and lenders’ incentives to adjust rates to move them at the top of the list, one might
expect online lenders to frequently adjust their rates in response to changing market
conditions. One might also expect there to be a willingness on the part of lenders
to make very small changes in rates, which could only be justiﬁed in markets with
insigniﬁcant menu costs.7
Lach and Tsiddon (1996) examine whether price adjustments in conventional re-
tail markets are synchronized or staggered across products. For multi-product ﬁrms
(or ﬁrms operating in a number of diﬀerent markets), the costs of price adjustment
aﬀect the synchronization of price adjustments across markets. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms
synchronously adjust prices for the products they sell. Many lenders at Microsurf
operate in a number of geographical areas (states). Our data permits us to examine
whether this important ﬁnding extends to online markets.
Theories of price rigidity also indicate that market structure inﬂuences the prob-
ability that a ﬁrm changes its price. For instance, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) argue
that the proﬁts lost by failing to adjust price in response to a cost shock are lower
in monopoly than in a Bertrand duopoly. Following this argument, Rotemberg and
Saloner (1987) show that monopolies are less likely to adjust prices in response to
cost changes than ﬁrms in duopoly markets. The empirical literature on the eﬀects
of market structure on price rigidity has also documented that the frequency of price
7In addition to the costs of price adjustment, the inﬂexibility of prices in response to cost or
demand shocks has been explained in the literature by such factors as supply adjustment costs, in-
ventories, long-term contracts, procyclical elasticity of demand, non-price market clearing, imperfect
information about product characteristics, and by ﬁrms’ conduct (e.g., price protection, breaks in
collusion during periods of slack in demand.)
6adjustments is lower in more concentrated markets. For example, Hannan and Berger
(1991) ﬁnd that deposit interest rates at conventional banks are more rigid in concen-
trated markets, where market concentration is measured by the Herﬁndahl index.8
Our paper is also related to a number of studies in the macroeconomic literature
that examine mortgage rate adjustments at the aggregate rather than ﬁrm level.
For example, Allen et al. (1999) examine the relationship between weekly average
mortgage rates and capital market rates.9 Based on weekly data, they ﬁnd that
the speed of adjustment in the aggregate mortgage rate is much more rapid in the
post-1981 period than in the pre-1981 period. Our analysis complements this macro
approach by examining micro determinants (such as market structure) of individual
online lenders’ rate adjustments based on a cross section of daily ﬁrm-level data.
In short, economic models that closely match the “price-setting” environment at
Microsurf predict not only that rates posted at Microsurf are dispersed — as they
indeed are — but that the probability that a ﬁrm changes its rate on any given day will
depend on whether costs changed that date, the number of competitors, and demand
characteristics (including terms of the mortgage).
3T h e D a t a
The theoretical and empirical papers discussed in the previous section suggest that
the institutional environment and market structure are critical determinants of ﬁrms’
pricing decisions. We begin by describing the institutional environment at Microsurf,
8An exception is Fisher and Konieczny (1995), who ﬁnd that prices for city newspapers that face
no competition are less rigid than the prices of oligopolistic newspapers.
9See also Roth (1988). In addition, there is an extensive mortgage literature in real estate ﬁnance,
dating back to Foster and Van Order (1984), which models mortgage default as a “put” option. For
a survey of the option-pricing approach to mortgage valuation, see Kau and Keenan (1995).
7which is an online price comparison site for mortgage rates.
Obtaining a mortgage loan for a property in a given state requires ﬁnding a lender
that oﬀers mortgages for property in that state. To obtain a list of lenders and rates
for a given state, a borrower may simply click the state where the property is located
(for example, Indiana) and Microsurf will return a list of lenders that oﬀer mortgages
for property in that state, along with the rates charged by these lenders. A mouse-
click or toll-free phone call permits a borrower to lock-in the lowest rate. Lenders
can update (in real time) information on the mortgage loans they oﬀer; Microsurf
promptly publishes the lenders’ oﬀers on its web site, with the most recently updated
quotes displayed at the top of the list. Microsurf requires mortgage providers to
include information about the qualifying ratios for the loan and the lock-in period.
Therefore, in the trading environment of Microsurf, lenders face relatively low menu
costs and consumers can easily become informed about mortgage characteristics and
rates charged by diﬀerent lenders.
The data, collected between April 30 and July 22 of 1998, include 9777 daily
observations on the rates charged by 92 diﬀerent lenders for a 30-year ﬁxed mortgage
with zero points in all states in the United States and in the District of Columbia.10
Interestingly, not all lenders posted rates in all states, nor did all lenders update their
rates daily. To avoid potential biases, only rates with time stamps corresponding
with collection dates are included in the sample.11
10Mortgage rates correspond to the annual percentage rates (APR), the interest rates which reﬂect
the annual cost of a mortgage, taking into account origination fees and other up-front charges. A
point, equal to one percent of the loan amount, is paid by a borrower at mortgage closing. The data
was gathered at the Microsurf ’s Internet site (http://www.microsurf.com) between 10 and 11 P.M.
daily, except for May 15, May 16, and July 6.
11As a practical matter, however, relatively few quotes were out of date. This likely stems from
the following factors. First, we collected data at the end of each day. Second, lenders with the most
up-to-date rates receive the beneﬁt of being placed on top of the list. Finally, Microsurf warns
consumers against relying on mortgage quotes that were not posted on the day of their search.
8As a proxy for lenders’ costs of funds, we us daily yields on U. S. Treasury securities
(henceforth, T-Bond Rates). Roth (1988) notes that the rate on 10-year T-Bonds is
a good proxy for a lender’s cost of funds on 30-year ﬁxed-rate mortgages, since the
average maturity of such mortgages is about 10 years. Thus, our analysis includes
speciﬁcations that use the 10-year T-Bond rate (and its lags) as a proxy for the
common component of lenders’ marginal cost. In addition, a number of authors have
argued that lenders costs are a function of short, medium, and long-term Treasury
rates. To account for the potential term structure eﬀects in lenders’ cost of funds,
we also include speciﬁc a t i o n st h a ti n c o r p o r a t et h r e ed i ﬀerent T-Bond rates (1-year,
10-year, and 30-year) and their lags.12 Our data permits us to disentangle changes
in lenders’ mortgage rates that are due to common cost shocks.
Table 2 provides summary information for the relevant data. The average mort-
gage rate in our data set was 7.4 percent, compared to an average 10-year T-Bond rate
of 5.5 percent. Also included in Table 2 are summary statistics for indicator functions
that take on a value of 1 if a lender’s mortgage rate (or the T-Bond rate) changed on
a given day and a zero otherwise. Notice that, on average, lenders changed rates only
16.1 percent of the time, even though the 10-year T-Bond rate changed 87.3 percent
of the time. Thus, the mortgage rates posted at Microsurf do not change nearly as
frequently as the ﬁrms’ costs.
Table 2 also presents the descriptive statistics for such mortgage characteristics
as lenders’ required qualifying ratios and the length of the mortgage lock-in period.
Lenders report two qualifying ratios a borrower must satisfy: the maximum allow-
able housing expense-to-income ratio (mortgage qualifying ratio) and the maximum
12There is a strong correlation between movements in Treasury rates of diﬀerent duration. For
the sample period, the correlation coeﬃcient is 0.92 between changes in 30-year and 10-year T-Bond
rates and 0.80 between changes in 1-year and 10-year T-Bond rates.
9allowable debt payment-to-income ratio (debt qualifying ratio).13 For example, a
pair of qualifying ratios (0.28,0.36) means that, to qualify for the posted rate, a bor-
rower cannot spend more than 28 percent of her gross income on mortgage payments,
and total debt payments cannot exceed 36 percent of gross income. In the sample,
the mortgage qualifying ratio ranges from 0.28 to 0.36 and the debt qualifying ratio
ranges from 0.36 to 0.45. Since qualifying ratios screen prospective borrowers accord-
ing to their ability to repay the loan, one would expect higher qualifying ratios to be
associated with a riskier pool of borrowers, and therefore higher quoted rates.
Lenders post not only a mortgage rate, but also the period of time that rate is
“locked-in.” On average, the duration of the lock-in period in the sample is 42.5 days.
The longest period a consumer can lock-in to rate is 90 days, while the most common
values for the lock-in period are 30 and 45 days.
While lenders may, in principle, change mortgage characteristics such as qualifying
ratios and the length of the lock-in period in real time, there is virtually no variation
over time in the characteristics of a particular lender’s mortgages.14 One possible
explanation is that a lender’s qualifying ratios are long-term decisions (quarterly
or annual, for example) designed to shape the risk characteristics of the pool of
mortgages as new (quarterly or annual) information is revealed about the number of
defaults and portfolio risk. Given the relatively short span of our data (3 months),
a particular lender’s qualifying ratios are therefore less likely to change (as is indeed
13The mortgage qualifying ratio is the ratio of a borrower’s monthly housing payments (mortgage
principal payment, mortgage interest payment, property taxes, and homeowner’s insurance) to the
gross monthly income. The debt qualifying ratio is the percentage of a borrower’s gross monthly
income that would cover the borrower’s monthly housing payments and any other monthly debt
payments. The qualifying ratio is only a rough measurement of a borrower’s credit-worthiness, and
many other factors, such as the borrower’s credit history, amount of down payment, and size of loan
can aﬀect a lender’s decision on whether to approve a loan.
14Mortgage ratios change less than 0.3 percent of time in the sample. As for the lock-in, about
0.03 percent of mortgage quotes are associated with a change in the lock-in period. Hence, compared
to changes in mortgage rates, mortgage characteristics are very rigid.
10the case) than its quoted mortgage rate.
In addition to these variables that capture information about loan characteristics
and the lenders’ marginal cost of funds, the information from the Microsurf site
permits us to construct a number of useful measures of market structure that reﬂect
the underlying competitiveness of the various markets served. For instance, for each
date we have information about the number of lenders oﬀering mortgages in each
state, which we refer to as the number of ﬁrms in the local market. On average, 4.8
ﬁrms list rates in each local market (state), with the number of ﬁrms ranging from 1
to 15. The number of lenders listing rates in a given state tends to vary over time.
Table 2 summarizes a dummy variable for local markets with 1 to 5 ﬁrms. Notice
that 67.5 percent of the rates were posted in markets where 1 to 5 lenders listed their
rates. The distribution of ﬁrms in that range is fairly uniform, from 9.8 percent where
only 1 ﬁrm listed a price to 13.9 percent where 5 ﬁrms listed a rate.
Many lenders listed rates in several markets (states). To the extent that multi-
market contact impacts lender decisions, we measure this overlap with the dummy
variable “0 to 10 Distinct Global Rivals.” This dummy variable takes on a value of
1i ft h eﬁrm that posted a rate in a given market competed on that date with up to
10 diﬀerent ﬁrms (either in the same market, or in diﬀerent markets). On average,
lenders compete against 14.6 diﬀerent lenders globally.
Another proxy for market power is markup, which is known to be related to the
Herﬁndahl index in a variety of oligopoly settings.15.W ed e ﬁne the variable Markup
as the diﬀerence between the mortgage rate a lender posts and the 10-year T-Bond
rate, as a percentage of the T-Bond rate. Since the T-Bond rate is a proxy for the
common component of lender costs, this measure proxies market power enjoyed by a
15See, for instance, Dansby and Willig (1979).
11lender (but ignores any unobservable diﬀerences in costs), and thus provides a gauge
of a lender’s ability to charge supra-competitive prices. Figure 4 shows that markups
vary considerably in Internet mortgage markets, from about 22 percent to 44 percent.
These diﬀerences can be attributed, for example, to diﬀerences in market concentra-
tion, non-price aspects of mortgages and other product heterogeneities, as well as
unobserved heterogeneity in lender costs. In some of the econometric speciﬁcations
presented below, we include Markup as a crude control for otherwise unobservable
mortgage characteristics that contribute to lenders’ market power.
Finally, there is considerable heterogeneity among ﬁrms in the timing of rate ad-
justments, as well as their propensities to change posted rates. To illustrate, consider
Figure 5, which depicts the timing of rate changes by two prominent online lenders
in Texas: Access National Mortgage and MEC-Online. Notice that on several occa-
sions, one lender changed its rate while the other did not change its rate over the
period surrounding the rate change. Figure 6 displays the cumulative distribution of
the ﬁrms’ frequencies of rate changes, pooled across all states and dates. Notice that
about 8 percent of the lenders in our sample never adjusted their mortgage rates,
while 9 percent of the lenders changed their rates more than 50 percent of the time.
We believe these data on online mortgage rates are well-suited for analyzing the
factors that aﬀect lenders’ price adjustment decisions. Our data span markets in
diﬀerent states in the United States, with diﬀering numbers of local and global com-
petitors; we enjoy a panel data of daily observations at the level of individual online
lenders. Thus, we are in a position to examine empirically the determinants and
nature of price adjustments in the online market for mortgages.
124 Empirical Analysis
I nt h i ss e c t i o n ,w eu s et h ea b o v ed a t at oe x a m i n et h ei m p a c to fm a r k e ts t r u c t u r e
and other economic factors on lenders’ propensities to change posted mortgage rates,
the duration of posted mortgage rates, and the responsiveness of posted rates to cost
shocks.
4.1 The Propensity to Change Posted Rates
From the theoretical considerations in Section 2, one would expect a lender’s decision
to adjust the rate it charges in state s on date t to depend on whether its marginal
cost of funds changed on that date, on the number of local and global competitors
the ﬁrm faces on that date, and such mortgage loan characteristics as the mortgage
qualifying ratio, debt qualifying ratio, and the number of days the mortgage rate is
locked-in.
When lenders’ costs of funds change, they are more likely to adjust their mortgage
rates. While theory indicates that lenders are less likely to adjust rates in more con-
centrated local and/or global markets, preliminary data analysis reveals that lenders
tend to adjust their rates synchronously in all the states in which they post rates on
a given day. This suggests that a lender’s decision to change its rate on a given date
m a yb em o r ea ﬀected by global rather than local competition. One would also expect
lenders with high qualifying ratios to set a higher mortgage rate to compensate for
the increase in the risk of lending money to a broader pool of borrowers.16 Adverse se-
lection and moral hazard problems that arise from the asymmetry of information can
16On the other hand, if less credit-worthy consumers are also the ones who are more price-sensitive,
ﬁrms may have an oﬀsetting incentive to charge them a lower rate. This means that the relationship
between the qualifying ratios and mortgage rates could be ambiguous.
13be potentially more prevalent when lenders set high qualifying ratios. To the extent
that these lenders are less selective and therefore attract a more risky clientele, one
might expect them to build a sizeable cushion into their rate, thereby eliminating the
need for frequent rate changes that could exacerbate adverse selection problems. One
might, therefore, expect the mortgage rates of such lenders to be more rigid. Finally,
one would expect lenders with longer lock-in periods to change rates less frequently,
as their posted rates would have a cushion built in to deal with random day-to-day
changes in the business environment that will naturally occur during the lock period.
We use the data described in Section 3 to test these hypotheses. Table 3 presents
results from binary change models in which we estimate the relationship between
Change, an indicator variable for the incidence of a rate change by a lender17, and a
linear function of the explanatory variables. These regressions capture the impact of
changes in explanatory variables on lenders’ propensities to change their posted rates;
negative coeﬃcients imply that an increase in the explanatory variable decreases the
likelihood that a lender changes its rate. We report estimated coeﬃcients and their p-
values for a simple OLS and two Logit speciﬁcations, as well as the implied marginal
eﬀects (at the mean) for each logit speciﬁcation. Since the dependent variable is
an indicator function, the limited dependent variable (Logit) speciﬁcations are better
suited for the analysis; the simple OLS speciﬁcation is reported in column 1 to merely
serve as a point of reference.
In addition to the explanatory variables of interest listed in Table 3, all speciﬁ-
cations include controls for day-of-week eﬀects and binary cost-of-fund eﬀects. The
former control for potential heterogeneity in ﬁrms’ propensities to change mortgage
17Changeist equals one if lender i’s mortgage rate has changed on date t in state s,c o m p a r e dt o
the mortgage rate advertised by the lender in the same state on an earlier date in the sample, and
zero if the rate has not changed.
14rates on diﬀerent days of the week (e.g., Monday or Friday eﬀects). The binary
cost-of-funds eﬀects use indicator variables for changes in the 10-year T-Bond rate
(and 5 lags) as a proxy for cost shocks experienced by lenders. Speciﬁcations with
binary term structure eﬀects add indicator variables for changes in 1-year and 30-year
T-Bond rates (and 5 lags of each), and therefore represent a more general proxy for
shocks to lenders’ marginal cost of funds.
Notice that the results summarized in Table 3 tend to be robust across diﬀerent
speciﬁcations.18 The signs of the parameter estimates are broadly consistent with
what one would expect based on the theories discussed earlier: Firms’ operating in
more concentrated markets or oﬀering mortgages with more liberal characteristics
(qualifying ratios or lock-in periods) tend to have lower propensities to change their
rates.
The most interesting aspect of the results in Table 3 is the light it sheds on the
impact of market structure on lenders’ decisions to change mortgage rates. Consider
ﬁrst the simple OLS regressions in column 1. Firms that face 10 or fewer global
rivals are less likely to change rates than those who face more than 10 global rivals.
Thus, higher global concentration results in more rigid prices. For the speciﬁcations
reported in Table 3, a ﬁrm that faces 10 or fewer diﬀerent global rivals is 4.7 percent
(OLS 1) to 6.0 percent (Logit 2) less likely to change its rate on a given day than a ﬁrm
facing more global rivals. Furthermore, in all speciﬁcations the estimated coeﬃcients
are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. Thus, there is strong evidence that
prices tend to be more rigid in markets where ﬁrms face less global competition.
The signs of the estimated coeﬃcients for the eﬀects of local competition tell a
18In an earlier version of this paper, we showed that the results are also robust to the exclusion
day-of-week ﬁxed eﬀects, the exclusion of lagged values of the various T-Bond rates, and diﬀering
bin sizes for the number of distinct global and local rivals.
15similar story, although the marginal eﬀects (and their signiﬁcance) are lower. For
instance, in the most general speciﬁcation (Logit 2), the estimates imply that a ﬁrm
that faces 5 or fewer local rivals is 1.7 percent more likely to change its posted rate
on a given day. This eﬀect, which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level,
is three times smaller than the corresponding eﬀect of global competition.
Finally, the results in Table 3 indicate that lenders with more liberal loan charac-
teristics are less likely to change their rates. While the inverse relationship between
the qualifying ratios and changes in mortgage rates holds in all cases, the eﬀect is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level only for the debt qualifying ratio in
the Logit 2 speciﬁcation. The estimated marginal eﬀect of −1.068 implies that a ﬁrm
having a debt qualifying ratio that is 5 percentage points higher than the mean is 5.3
percent less likely to change its rate. Finally, notice that in all speciﬁcations, there
is a negative and statistically signiﬁcant relation between the days a lender locks in
a rate and its propensity to change rates. A ﬁrm that oﬀers a lock that is 10 days
longer than the average lock is about 2 percent less likely to change its rate.
4.2 The Duration of Posted Rates
In order to examine the robustness of the above ﬁndings, we also use duration analysis.
Following this approach, we look at the impact of market structure and mortgage
characteristics on the length of time between mortgage rate adjustments by a lender.
In this case, the dependent variable is the number of days between consecutive changes
i nal e n d e r ’ sm o r t g a g er a t e .T oa c c o u n tf o rt h ef a c tt h a tt h eﬁr s ta n dt h el a s td a t e
on which a lender posts its mortgage rate do not coincide with the sample period, we
treat observations as censored.
Figure 7 depicts the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier survival functions estimated at
16the means of the sample for markets with few and many rivals. The horizontal axis
measures the duration of mortgage quotes (in days), while the vertical axis measures
the proportion of posted rates that have survived (not changed) for a given number
of days. The fact that the dashed survival curve for lenders facing 10 or fewer global
rivals lies above that for lenders facing more than 10 rivals suggests that rates are more
durable in more concentrated markets. To formally test this hypothesis, we performed
nonparametric rank tests. The log-rank test as well as the Wilcoxon (Breslow-Gehan)
test conﬁrm that market concentration — both global and local — has a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the duration of mortgage rate quotes.19
We also performed parametric tests based on maximum likelihood estimates from
exponential and Weibull duration models. The distributional assumptions underlying
these models have diﬀering implications for the duration-dependence of ﬁrms’ posted
rates; the exponential speciﬁcation implies a constant hazard function and hence no
duration dependence, while the Weibull speciﬁcation allows for positive or negative
duration dependence.20 All speciﬁcations include controls for day-of-week eﬀects, as
well as cost-of-fund eﬀects. Here, cost-of-fund eﬀects reﬂect levels of change in the
10-year T-Bond rate (and 5 lags); speciﬁcations with term structure eﬀects add levels
of change (and 5 lags) in 1-year and 30-year T-Bond rates.
Table 4 reports estimated hazard ratios and their p-values. The estimated hazard
ratios are related to both the propensity of lenders to change mortgage rates, as
well as the expected duration of a given rate quote. Speciﬁcally, hazard ratios below
19The χ2-statistics and corresponding p-values for the test for equality of survival functions for
markets with 10 or fewer global rivals and markets with more than 10 global rivals are χ2
(1) =8 .26
(p =0 .004)a n dχ2
(1) =5 .21 (p =0 .025). The corresponding statistics for the eﬀect of local
competition are similar: χ2
(1) =6 .76 (p =0 .009)a n dχ2
(1) =5 .02 (p =0 .025).
20We also ran regressions based on the distribution-free Cox proportional hazards model. The
Cox model does not make any distributional assumptions on the baseline hazard function, and yields
estimates similar to those reported in Table 4.
17unity indicate that an increase in the explanatory variable decreases the conditional
probability (hazard) that a lender adjusts its rate, and hence increases the implied
length of time between rate adjustments (rate quotes are more durable or “rigid”).
A comparison of the estimated log-likelihood functions reveals that Weibull model
provides a slightly better ﬁt for the data. The shape parameter in the Weibull model
is negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting a slightly negative duration dependence for
our data. However, the empirical ﬁndings regarding the impact of the explanatory
variables are very similar for the two models. The estimated hazard ratios in Ta-
ble 4 broadly suggest that ﬁrms operating in more concentrated markets or oﬀering
mortgages with more liberal characteristics tend to have more durable rates. How-
ever, only the global measure of competition and the days locked-in are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Table 5 summarizes the implications of the estimated duration models for the
duration of posted mortgage rates. The mean duration of mortgage rates across all
m a r k e t sv a r i e sf r o m24.5 days (for the exponential speciﬁcation without term struc-
ture eﬀects) to 28.7 days (for the Weibull speciﬁcation with term structure eﬀects).
Mean durations are consistently (and signiﬁcantly) lower in markets with more than
10 global rivals, where mortgage rates remain unchanged for 22.3 to 25.5 days, on
average. In contrast, in more concentrated markets, the mean duration ranges from
29.1 to 35.4 days. While the implied median durations are somewhat lower, they
exhibit a similar pattern. In short, the duration of posted mortgage rates is 30 to
40 percent longer in more concentrated markets, depending on the speciﬁcation. As
shown in Figure 8, a similar pattern is observed when one examines the estimated
hazard functions. This graph implies that, after allowing for duration dependence
and controlling for other factors, the conditional probability of rate changes is uni-
18formly higher in more competitive markets and uniformly lower in more concentrated
markets.
Finally, all estimated duration models imply that mortgage rates of ﬁrms oﬀering
longer lock-in periods are signiﬁcantly more durable. For instance, in the Weibull
speciﬁcation with term structure eﬀects, the estimated mean duration of mortgage
rates increases from 23.7 days for a 30-day lock-in period to 26.4 days for a 45-day
lock-in period (a 10-percent increase in rate durability).
4.3 Responses to Cost Shocks
Up to this point, our analysis has focused on the rigidity of lenders’ rates. While
we have examined the determinants of duration and lenders’ propensities to change
online rates, we have yet to discuss the magnitude and speed of adjustment of posted
rates to changes in the levels of lenders’ costs of funds.
Table 6 illustrates that, similar to existing studies of traditional markets,21 price
adjustments in online markets exhibit asymmetries in the magnitude of upward and
downward adjustments in mortgage rates. Conditional on a price change, lenders were
almost as likely to increase rates as decrease rates. However, the associated upward
price adjustments were on average larger in magnitude than downward adjustments
(0.147 and −0.122 percent, respectively). Upward price adjustments are also more
dispersed, ranging from 0.001 to 0.706, with a standard deviation of 0.098,c o m p a r e d
to downward price adjustments, which range from −0.001 to −0.400,w i t has t a n -
dard deviation of 0.043.T h i sd i ﬀerence in the magnitude of upward and downward
adjustments in mortgage rates is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Also
21See, for example, the papers by Allen et al. (1999) and Hannan and Berger, (1991). For an
alternative view, see Carlton (1986).
19note that we observe very small changes in mortgage rates, which is consistent with
the notion that menu costs are indeed very small in the online mortgage markets.
There is an extensive microeconomics literature documenting asymmetric responses
of prices in conventional markets to cost shocks; see Peltzman (2000) and Borenstein
et al. (1997) for a discussion of this line of research.22 We follow the approach of
these authors and examine a variety of distributed lag models to explore determi-
nants of changes in levels of mortgage rates. These results are presented in Table 7,
and reveal that the patterns displayed in Table 6 persist even after controlling for
potential heterogeneities (state and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects), mortgage characteristics, and
market structure eﬀects.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 7 present estimates for symmetric speciﬁcations
where it is assumed that ﬁrms respond symmetrically to increases and decreases in
their cost of funds (the 10-year T-Bond rate). Results are fairly consistent across
all speciﬁcations, regardless of whether one controls for market structure, mortgage
characteristics and ﬁrm/state heterogeneities. For example, in our most general sym-
metric response model (Fixed Eﬀects 1), a 100 basis point increase in the cost of
funds leads to an immediate 54.7 basis point increase in mortgage rates, a 25.6 basis
point increase the following day and a 17.9 basis point increase the next day. The
cumulative response after two days (summarized in Table 8) is 98.2 basis points.
The second three columns of Table 7 allow for asymmetric responses. Notice
that in all speciﬁcations, increases in the cost of funds have a greater impact on
mortgage rates than do decreases. For instance, in our most general asymmetric
speciﬁcation (Fixed Eﬀects 2), a 100 basis point increase in the cost of funds results
in a concurrent increase in mortgage rates of 79.3 basis points, while a 100 basis point
22For a macroeconomic approach, see the studies by Allen et al. (1999) and Haney (1988) who
also ﬁnd asymmetry in the adjustment of traditional mortgage rates to shocks in capital markets.
20decrease in the cost of funds results in only a 24.2 basis point reduction in mortgage
rates. In all speciﬁcations, these responses are statistically diﬀerent from one another
for concurrent, one-lagged and two-lagged changes, and responses are larger for cost
increases than cost decreases. These results are robust to a variety of controls, dummy
variables, and lag speciﬁcations. As shown in Table 8, the cumulative responses of
mortgage rates to cost changes are greater for cost increases than cost decreases.
We also ran a variety of regressions to explore whether these asymmetric responses
might be more prevalent in concentrated markets. Similar to Peltzman (2000), we
found no evidence of a systematic relationship between the asymmetry in rate adjust-
ments and market structure. Our ﬁnding that online markets exhibit asymmetries
similar to those documented in traditional brick-and-mortar markets suggests that
the asymmetric price responses are probably not driven by menu costs or similar fric-
tions. These are virtually zero in online mortgage markets, yet we ﬁnd asymmetric
responses comparable to those found in studies of traditional markets.
As noted by Peltzman (2000), there are no well-established theoretical explana-
tions for asymmetric responses of prices to changes in costs, so any attempt to explain
the observed asymmetries will be speculative at best. One possibility, suggested by
Allen et al. (1999), is that lenders’ risk premia change asymmetrically with changes
in their costs of funds. While these authors argue that such asymmetries could stem
from the asymmetric impact of lower mortgage rates on pre-payment (reﬁnance) risk,
other channels may also lead to asymmetric changes in risk premia (and hence, asym-
metric responses to cost shocks). For instance, changes in lenders’ rates will generally
change the pool of borrowers, potentially changing the nature of adverse selection.
To the extent that the severity of adverse selection problems depend on the level of
mortgage rates, the risk premia associated with rate increases may well diﬀer from
21those for rate decreases. This could lead to the observed asymmetric responses. Al-
ternatively, lenders may respond asymmetrically to cost changes in an attempt to
mitigate adverse selection problems.
Another potential explanation, which we believe is particularly relevant in online
mortgage markets where consumers can easily monitor lenders’ rates, stems from the
diﬀering eﬀects of rate increases and decreases on the incentives of existing customers
to renegotiate their loans. Other things equal, lenders may be more reluctant to
reduce rates because doing so might induce existing borrowers (who are already paying
ah i g h e rr a t e )t or e ﬁnance at the lower rate. Likewise, rate reductions might induce
customers who have locked-in to higher rates–but whose applications are still “in
process”– to “back out” in an attempt to obtain more favorable rates.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper represents a ﬁrst attempt to examine the determinants of ﬁrms’ deci-
sions to change prices in online markets. Our analysis, based on nearly 10,000 rate
quotes from Microsurf (an Internet site that provides comparative information about
the mortgage rates oﬀered by diﬀerent lenders in all 50 states and the District of
Columbia), indicates that market structure is an important determinant of lenders’
decisions to adjust rates.
The answer to the question “Are prices sticky online?” is largely a matter of
perspective. On the one hand, while lenders’ cost of funds changed on more than 87
percent of days in our sample, lenders’ changed their posted mortgage rates only 16
percent of the time. In addition, the median duration of quoted mortgage rates is
between 16.6 and 19.2 days. In this sense, prices appear to be quite rigid in online
22markets. On the other hand, lenders who changed their rates passed through about
98 percent of cost changes to consumers within 2 days. In this sense, prices are much
less sticky than at traditional retail outlets (see Peltzman, 2000). Thus, the evidence
suggests that while ﬁrms do not change rates very frequently, those ﬁr m st h a td o
change rates tend to adjust them rapidly.
More importantly, the evidence suggests that online prices are more rigid in con-
centrated markets. In particular, lenders are about 5 or 6 p e r c e n tm o r el i k e l yt o
change rates in concentrated markets than in more competitive markets. Duration
analysis revealed that mortgage rates are between 30 and 40 p e r c e n tm o r ed u r a b l ei n
concentrated markets. While our ﬁnding that rates are less ﬂexible in concentrated
markets is consistent with theories of price rigidity, an important puzzles remains:
Why is a high degree of price rigidity and asymmetry observed in online mortgage
markets, where menu costs and other frictions are virtually zero?
Finally, similar to recent studies of conventional markets, we ﬁnd that online
mortgage rates are more responsive to cost increases than cost decreases, with cost
increases being passed on to consumers about twice as quickly as cost decreases. While
we have provided some speculative arguments regarding factors that might contribute
to the observed asymmetries, further theoretical work in this area is needed.
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27Table 1: Turnorver in the Identity of the Lender Offering the Lowest Rate in its Markets
How Frequently the Lender Offered the 
Lowest Rate in its Local Markets
Never (0 Percent of the time) 17 18.48% 18.48%
Rarely (Less than 10 percent of the time) 15 16.30% 34.78%
Sometimes (Between 10 and 50 percent of the time) 39 42.39% 77.17%
Often (Between 50 and 90 percent of the time) 17 18.48% 95.65%
Very Frequently (Over 90 percent of the time) 2 2.17% 97.83%






PercentageVariable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Mortgage Rate (30 Yr. Fixed Annual Percentage Rate) 7.369 0.128 6.987 7.967
T-Bond Rate (10 Yr. Fixed) 5.526 0.093 5.380 5.790
Indicator for Change in Mortgage Rate 0.161 0.368 0 1
Indicator for Change in T-Bond Rate (10 Yr. Fixed) 0.873 0.333 0 1
Lender's Markup 0.333 0.034 0.224 0.437
Lender's Mortgage Qualifying Ratio 0.309 0.025 0.280 0.360
Lender's Debt Qualifying Ratio 0.376 0.015 0.360 0.450
Number of Days Locked in to Rate 42.511 13.362 30 90
Number of Firms in Local Market 4.823 3.005 1 15
Number of Distinct Global Rivals 14.585 9.102 0 45
0 to 10 Distinct Global Rivals 0.399 0.490 0 1
1 to 5 Firms in Local Market 0.675 0.468 0 1
Total Number of Mortgage Rates Observed: 9777
Table 2: Summary StatisticsMarg. Marg.
Effect Effect
0 to 10 distinct global rivals  -0.047 0.000 -0.368 0.000 -0.054 -0.404 0.000 -0.060
1 to 5 firms in the Local Market -0.012 0.180 -0.084 0.189 -0.012 -0.116 0.081 -0.017
Mortgage qualifying ratio -0.317 0.329 -2.384 0.291 -0.352 -0.797 0.725 -0.119
Debt qualifying ratio -0.350 0.538 -2.729 0.494 -0.403 -7.160 0.074 -1.068
Days Locked-in to Rate -0.002 0.000 -0.016 0.000 -0.002 -0.016 0.000 -0.002
Day-of-Week Fixed Effects
Binary Cost of Fund Effects







Table 3: Impact of Market Structure and Mortgage Characteristics on a Firm's Propensity to Change its 
Quoted Mortgage Rate
† The binary change models use zero-one variables to measure changes in mortgage rates and changes in the 
cost of funds. For example, the dependent variable is a zero-one variable that equals one if firm i changed its 
mortgage rate on date t in state s, and equals zero otherwise. Reported standard errors are Hubert-White 






 Logit 1 Logit 2
Binary Change Models†0 to 10 distinct global rivals  0.670 0.000 0.682 0.000 0.618 0.000 0.628 0.000
1 to 5 firms in the Local Market 1.008 0.917 1.006 0.935 0.975 0.736 0.976 0.739
Mortgage qualifying ratio 0.029 0.170 0.043 0.198 0.415 0.726 0.427 0.724
Debt qualifying ratio 0.660 0.930 0.443 0.857 0.002 0.155 0.002 0.146
Days Locked-in to Rate 0.981 0.000 0.981 0.000 0.979 0.000 0.979 0.000
Day-of-Week Fixed Effects














No No Yes Yes
Yes
Table 4: Impact of Market Structure and Mortgage Characteristics on Duration of Quoted 
Mortgage Rates
†† The dependent variable is the number of days firm i has kept its mortgage rate fixed on date t in state 
s. Reported standard errors are Hubert-White (corrected) standard errors. 
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20.2 ≤ 10 Rivals
All Markets 24.5 17.0
>10 Rivals 23.2 15.1
≤ 10 Rivals 30.3 19.8
All Markets 25.5 16.6
>10 Rivals 24.6 17.1
>10 Rivals 25.5 17.0
≤ 10 Rivals 34.1 23.7
All Markets 27.7 19.2Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Level of Change in Mortgage Rate 1512 0.011 0.154 -0.400 0.706
Absolute Value of Change in Mortgage Rate 1512 0.134 0.076 0.001 0.706
Level of Increase in Mortgage Rate 746 0.147 0.098 0.001 0.706
Level of Decrease in Mortgage Rate 766 -0.122 0.043 -0.400 -0.001
Table 6: Levels of Rate ChangesChange in T-Bond Rate 0.338* 0.024 0.407* 0.025 0.547* 0.025
Change in T-Bond Rate Lagged 1 Day 0.150* 0.021 0.189* 0.021 0.256* 0.022
Change in T-Bond Rate Lagged 2 Days 0.100* 0.019 0.134* 0.019 0.179* 0.019
Increase in T-Bond Rate 0.615* 0.046 0.646* 0.049 0.745* 0.047
Decrease in T-Bond Rate 0.074* 0.034 0.190* 0.037 0.353* 0.035
Increase in T-Bond Rate Lagged 1 Day 0.216* 0.048 0.304* 0.048
Decrease in T-Bond Rate Lagged 1 Day 0.138* 0.038 0.181* 0.037
Increase in T-Bond Rate Lagged 2 Days 0.117* 0.038 0.070** 0.037
Decrease in T-Bond Rate Lagged 2 Days 0.122* 0.035 0.250* 0.035
Other Controls:
Day-of-Week Fixed Effects
2 Date Fixed Effects & Trend
Market Structure & Mortgage Characteristics
State & Firm Fixed Effects
R-Square
Yes No Yes Yes No
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
0.27 0.31






Yes Yes No No
Yes
Yes
Market structure controls include dummy variables for 0 to 10 distinct global rivals, 1 to 5 firms in the local market, and lender's markup. Date fixed effects include dummy variables for 
observed structural changes on May 20, 1998 and for dates after May 20, 1998.
* Denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
** Denotes significance at the 10 percent level
0.26 0.30
Table 7: Symmetric and Asymmetric Responses of Mortgage Rates to Changes in Costs
The dependent variable is the value of change in a firm i's mortgage rate on date t in state s. Reported standard errors in OLS regressions are Hubert-White (corrected) standard errors. 





Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Fixed Effects 1
Coef.Cost Increases Cost Decreases
Immediate 0.547 0.745 0.353
1 Day 0.804 1.049 0.534
2 Days 0.982 1.119 0.784
Table 8: Cumulative Response of Quoted Mortgage Rate to Cost Changes 
(Based on General Models with Fixed Effects)
Symmetric Response
Asymmetric ResponseFigure 1: Minimum, Maximum, And Average Mortgage Rates over TimeFigure 2: Cumulative Distribution of Mortgage Rates (Pooled Across States, Firms, and Time)Figure 3: Cumulative Distribution of Mortgage Rates on July 22, 1998 (Pooled Across 
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